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Abstract
Among policy-makers and academics there is a controversial discussion whether the tax mix in-
fluences labor market performance in advanced industrialized countries. Many economists argue
that the total tax burden rather than the tax-mix matters for aggregate employment, whereas nei-
ther the burden nor the mix play major roles in determining unemployment in the long run. This
paper aims at combining this literature with an analysis informed by comparative welfare state
analysis. It starts with a discussion of standard economic accounts – the “incentives literature” –
and looks for cases where tax-mixes affect labor markets. Then the analysis shifts to a comparative
point of view. Contemporaneous welfare states not only differ in terms of social expenditures, but
also in the ways they fund these expenditures by various forms of taxation. The paper shows
some of the linkages between the “tax regime” on the one hand, and the regime for social expen-
ditures, and namely social transfers, on the other hand. The tax regime is, however, an imperfect
“mirror image” of social expenditures and has the capacity to shape labor market outcomes. In
particular, countries with high payroll and indirect taxation pose more problems for (low-wage)
private sector employment than countries relying predominantly on income taxation. Moreover,
since all countries have opened up their goods and capital markets, taxation these days should
matter more for labor market outcomes than in times when markets were still national in nature.
The paper attempts to judge the empirical plausibility of these claims. The empirical estimations
generate three tentative results: First, there is some evidence that payroll and indirect taxation is
more harmful for labor markets than income taxation. Second, this is particularly true for non-
tradables sectors with a low degree of productivity. Third, there is some evidence that the impact
of taxation has increased in the last decades. Taken together, the three results add to an explana-
tion why some welfare states in continental Europe have both low employment and high unem-
ployment rates.
Zusammenfassung
Unter politischen Entscheidungsträgern und Wissenschaftlern wird immer wieder darüber disku-
tiert, ob die Mischung unterschiedlicher Steuerarten („Steuer-Mix“) Arbeitsmarktergebnisse be-
einflusst. Viele Ökonomen behaupten, dass lediglich die Gesamtsteuerhöhe für die Arbeitsauf-
nahme relevant ist. Für die Höhe der Arbeitslosigkeit sei weder der Steuer-Mix noch die Steuer-
höhe entscheidend. Das vorliegende Diskussionspapier hat zum Ziel, diese Diskussion in den
Rahmen der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatenforschung einzubetten. Zunächst werden ökono-
mische Anreizmodelle diskutiert, in denen Steuern einen Einfluss auf Arbeitsmarktergebnisse
ausüben. Zudem zeigt der Vergleich von Wohlfahrtsstaaten, dass sich Länder nicht nur bezüglich
der Sozialausgaben unterscheiden, sondern auch bezüglich des Steuer-Mixes. Des weiteren wer-
den einige Verbindungslinien zwischen dem Steuerregime und dem Regime von Sozialausgaben,
insbesondere von sozialpolitisch motivierten Transfers, gezogen. Allerdings sind Steuer- und
Transferregime keine perfekten „Spiegelbilder“ voneinander. Daher lohnt es sich für die Wohl-
fahrtsstaatenforschung zu untersuchen, welchen Einfluss das Steuerregime auf den Arbeitsmarkt
ausübt. Besonders bedeutsam ist hierbei die These, dass Länder mit hohen Sozialversicherungs-
beiträgen und indirekten Steuern den privaten (Niedriglohn-)Sektor stärker belasten als Länder
mit hohen Einkommenssteuern. Zudem sollte dieser Effekt heute stärker sein als noch zu Zeiten,
in denen die Länder Barrieren zwischen Güter- und Kapitalmärkten aufrecht erhielten. Diese The-
sen werden durch empirische Schätzungen evaluiert, welche drei wesentliche Ergebnisse liefern:
Erstens scheinen Sozialversicherungsbeiträge und indirekte Steuern schädlicher für den Arbeits-
markt zu sein als Einkommenssteuern. Zweitens gilt dies vor allem für den Sektor nicht handelba-
rer Güter mit geringer Produktivität. Drittens zeichnet sich ab, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen
Steuern und Arbeitsmarktergebnissen in den letzten Jahrzehnten zugenommen hat. Alle drei Punkte
zusammen tragen zu einer Beantwortung der Frage bei, warum einige kontinentaleuropäische
Länder derzeit von hohen Arbeitslosen- und geringen Beschäftigungsraten gekennzeichnet sind.
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1 Introduction
Contemporary scholarship about welfare state analysis argues that there is a
trade-off between the size of public redistribution and economic efficiency in
terms of employment and growth (Iversen/Wren 1998). This trade-off is medi-
ated through a system of institutions that enhances or neutralizes undesirable
consequences (Garrett 1998; Scharpf 1993; Iversen 1999). In this context we should
ask ourselves two key questions: Which institutions should we evaluate, and how
should we measure them? Leaving wage-bargaining institutions aside, a prime
avenue taken in the course of investigation is the use of social expenditure data.
However, attempts of finding an employment effect of social benefits show only
moderate results on the aggregate level (e.g. Kemmerling 2001: 25). One of the
reasons is that the expenditure side of the public budget only shows a part of the
national social policy programs. For instance, it does not cover taxation of social
benefits or tax allowances with social purposes (Adema 1999). Since it is difficult
to account for a total net government budget, the analysis of the effects taxation
has on employment is an interesting alternative to approaches concentrating on
government outlays.
Of course, this discussion is far from new. For quite some time, economists have
modeled the impact of taxation on unemployment or employment.1 The major
conclusion they reach is twofold: First, unemployment is only moderately influ-
enced by taxation in the long run. Second, it is the total tax burden that matters
for employment, but not necessarily the mix of different forms of taxation. Both
ideas are somewhat at odds with the resurgent discussion about the apparent
“under-performance” of low-wage sectors in European economies. The usual
suspect is the taxation of labor, be it in the forms of income taxes or social security
contributions. But how do consumption taxes fit into this picture? Prima facie,
they should be particularly harmful for these sectors because they reduce both
the demand and supply for low-wage labor (e.g. Scharpf 2000a).
This discussion paper aims at bridging the gap between economic approaches
and macro-institutional approaches to welfare state regimes. Different regimes of
welfare state taxation should lead to different economic outcomes in terms of
(un)employment. Four key questions come to the fore. First, how harmful is taxa-
tion in industrialized countries for employment? Taxation should be linked to dif-
ferent types of welfare states, on the one hand, and shape labor market outcomes,
on the other. Second, how do these effects vary in a temporal and cross-country
                                                  
I thank Fritz Scharpf, Bernhard Kittel, Steffen Ganghof, and Christian Albrecht Larsen for
their comments on previous drafts.
1 For related surveys see Bean (1994), Daveri (2001), or Nickell and Layard (1999).
6 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/8
dimension? This leads to the search for structural breaks and different institu-
tional settings governing the “tax-employment link.” Third, which are the sectors
that suffer most from high taxation? It has to be shown whether low-wage jobs
are particularly prone to tax-induced crowding out and whether this shows up on
an aggregate level. Finally and most importantly, is there an optimal tax-mix that
mitigates the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution? This discussion pa-
per intends to deliver some cautious analytical and empirical insights into these
questions.
The focus of the paper lies in analyzing different strategies of contemporary wel-
fare states to fund social expenditures. With a growing dependent population,
advanced welfare states depend more and more on high levels of taxation. This is
the driving force behind the growing demand for increasing overall tax revenues
in OECD countries. Growth of taxation decelerated only marginally in the 1990s,
and hence, on average, taxes rose to 37.2 percent of GDP in 1997 (OECD 1999: 18).
For the 18 countries analyzed in this paper, the average was even slightly higher,
namely 40.9 percent.2 At the same time, unemployment rates remained at unabat-
edly high levels: the OECD-18 average for 1997 was 8.2 percent, ranging from 3.4
percent in Norway to 12.7 percent in Belgium. Similarly, employment levels are
low in most continental European economies and high in Scandinavia and the
Anglo-Saxon world.3
It seems reasonable to argue that high tax burdens can be partially blamed for the
increasing tightness of labor markets in many industrialized countries. Simple
economic analysis of comparative statistics indicates that higher tax rates should
lead to lower net wages and a smaller labor supply. On the demand side, higher
taxation is supposed to lead to higher unit labor costs that, in turn, crowd out
employment in sheltered sectors with low levels of productivity (Scharpf 1986)
and decrease overall competitiveness in exposed sectors. The latter argument has
received a lot of attention in the wake of increasing globalization (e.g. Saeger
1997, Wood 1994).
However, conventional wisdom says that these claims have to be evaluated cau-
tiously. Some welfare states – Denmark, for instance – have relatively high tax
burdens and yet quite low unemployment rates, as well as high levels of em-
ployment. Empirical research of labor supply on a microlevel has shown that the
                                                  
2 The 18 countries are Australia (AUL), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN),
Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy
(ITA), Japan (JAP), Netherlands (NET), New Zealand (NEW), Norway (NOR), Swe-
den (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), United Kingdom (UK), United States (US).
3 Total employment as a percentage of the working age population in 1997 was lowest
for Italy (50.6) and highest for Switzerland (79.3).
Kemmerling: Employment Effects of Welfare State Taxation Regimes 7
impact of taxation has to be differentiated for various social groups and for dif-
ferent tax systems (Blundell 1995; Laisney/Pohlmeier/Staat 1995). Similarly,
critical arguments could be made for labor demand (Hamermesh 1993) and the
“globalization hypothesis” (Rowthorn/Ramaswamy 1999).
Scholars of comparative welfare state analysis have, on the whole, neglected the
efficiency effects of taxation. Instead, they have focused on the revenue side and
debated the link between redistribution and growth or employment (Iversen/
Wren 1998; Kenworthy 2001). Recently, however, more and more research has
been done on the funding of welfare states (e.g. Steinmo 2002; Swank 1998; Hal-
lerberg/Basinger 1998). Scharpf (2000a, 2000b) has explained cross-national and
cross-temporal variation in employment performance. He decomposes both the
independent variable “taxes” and the dependent variable “employment.” This
allows him to point out specific parts of taxation and their impact on sectors that
are particularly sensitive to taxation. Analyzing cross-sectional data for 13 OECD
countries, he finds that some types of taxation, namely social security contribu-
tions and indirect taxes, are harmful to private sector employment. Among dif-
ferent sectors, services with a low to intermediate input of skills are susceptible to
the perils of taxation (2000a: 206), whereas internationally exposed sectors such as
manufacturing are not very sensitive to taxation.
This discussion paper picks up this line of reasoning and analyzes in more detail
whether the evidence Scharpf offers is robust once it is controlled for context
variables. Specifically, it elaborates the relationship between employment and
taxation with the help of empirical estimations for core OECD countries in the pe-
riod from 1970 to 1997. Are some forms of taxation eminent in continental Euro-
pean welfare states, i.e. social security contributions and consumption taxes, more
harmful to employment than others? Has this effect increased over time because
it is being driven by increasing levels of globalization, as Scharpf argues?
To a certain degree, the empirical results of this paper corroborate the idea that
tax-mixes matter. The importance of taxation, especially of social security contri-
butions and consumption taxes, accounts for a deceleration of employment
growth in OECD countries. Moreover, the structure of taxation also matters for
the number of unemployed people. There is some evidence that sectors not (di-
rectly) exposed to world market competition are particularly sensitive to the tax-
mix. Finally, a direct, albeit crude, control for international competition does not
yield very promising results. The empirical results show temporal variation in the
impact of taxation, though the evidence for a clearly increasing trend is mixed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will review the
economic and comparative welfare state literature on taxation and employment.
It will show how tax and social transfer schemes are related and will scrutinize
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the argument that it makes a difference how welfare states tax labor. Of special
analytic interest is whether there are differences in three major forms of taxation,
namely income taxes, social security contributions, and indirect taxes. Section 3
will introduce the data and perform separated time-series and cross-sectional
analyses. The time-series analysis will be restricted to a comparison between the
US, Sweden, and Germany. Section 4 will present some pooled cross-sectional
models for estimating the impact of taxes on labor market outcomes. As a first
step, models are presented for overall private sector employment and unem-
ployment. Then the effects of tax-mixes on two sectors, manufacturing and serv-
ices, are analyzed. Finally, the section discusses whether the impact of taxes has
increased in the last few years. A concomitant issue – the role of increased inter-
national exposure – is also briefly addressed. Section 5 summarizes the main
points of the discussion paper.
2 Comparing Economic and Comparative Accounts of the
“Tax–Employment Link”
2.1 A Brief Overview of Economic Approaches
The basic framework for an analysis of the incidence of taxation is the standard
microeconomic approach to labor supply. Taxation leads ceteris paribus to a sub-
stitution effect: work is either replaced by more leisure, by other sources of in-
come, or by an increased amount of work in the future (Gustafsson 1996: 822;
Blundell/MaCurdy 1999). It may also lead to the consumption of goods that are
less labor-intensive. The main causal mechanism is a “wedge” between gross and
net wages. A lower net wage leads to a smaller supply of labor. Only if the in-
come effect (IE) of taxation surpasses the substitution effect (SE) does the labor
supply increase. Microeconometric studies have shown that, indeed, for some so-
cial groups such as single mothers, IE dominates SE (e.g. Blundell 1995: 19). We
would expect a more traditional scenario on an aggregate level for whole sectors
of an economy or even for the entire labor market. In other words, the labor sup-
ply should be elastic. However, this may serve as a caveat of the gendered pattern
of economic sectors across countries, a pattern that could distort empirical results.
Various “real world characteristics” (ibid.: 13) make a textbook-styled analysis of
labor supply difficult. For example, fixed costs of work differ between countries.
Among others, costs of childcare are much higher in continental Europe than in
North America or Scandinavia (Esping-Andersen 1999: 66). This implies that the
particularities of a welfare state even affect a simple version of economic model-
ing.
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Probably the most important factor of all is the specific nature of the tax system
itself. National income tax regimes differ in terms of progressiveness and the
number of tax “kinks,” both of which dilute the explanatory power of average tax
rates in international comparisons (Gustafsson 1996: 827; Nickell/Layard 1999:
3037). Similarly, different national treatments of the issue of joint taxation for
married couples make comparisons truly difficult. If Sweden, for instance, were
to apply the German system of joint income taxation, female labor force partici-
pation would – according to Gustafsson (1996: 833) – drop from 80 to 60 percent.
Within the same national system, different forms of taxation differ in at least
three ways: a) different tax bases, b) different functional forms with respect to in-
come, and – if social security contributions are included – c) a different degree of
entitlements for expected future returns. All three dimensions have pronounced
consequences for economic incentives experienced by individuals. For example, a
VAT taxes consumption instead of income at a flat rate, independent of the indi-
vidual’s income. There is no linkage to entitlements for the individual. This re-
duction of the incentives supplying labor may be offset by a “fiscal illusion”
caused by the failure of people, at times, to realize that real consumption wages
are falling (OECD 1995: 10). Typical income taxes use personal income as the tax
basis, rise progressively with increasing income, but do not grant further entitle-
ments. Finally, in most countries, social security contributions use wages as the
only tax basis. Commonly, there are no thresholds for low income, but individu-
als earn entitlements for future social benefits like pensions or medical assistance.
Hence, social security contributions may have distorting effects once they are
conceived as “forced savings” (OECD 1995: 11). Nevertheless, they are earmarked
for specific (private) purposes. These institutional characteristics imply that eco-
nomic incentives of the three types of taxation may shape labor market outcomes
differently.
Switching to a macroperspective of the labor market, the analytical framework
becomes much more complex even for the case of a closed economy. Supposed
wages are flexible; the increase of a payroll tax, for instance, will depend on the
elasticity of the labor supply. Inelastic supply will lead to lower net wages,
whereas totally elastic supply will lead to lower levels of employment (Gustafs-
son 1996: 836). Reviewing a large body of empirical literature, Hamermesh
(1993: 172) concludes that the greatest burden of taxation lies on wages. On the
aggregate level, employers are able to roll over additional labor costs onto labor
itself. In a similar vein, Bauer and Riphahn (1998) argue that a cut of payroll or
general taxation would only modestly improve German labor market perform-
ance rates in both employment and unemployment.
A further complexity arises when social security contributions are split between
employees and employers. Theoretically, there is no difference for the real econ-
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omy between increasing one of the two shares, an observation that has been la-
beled “Invariance of Incidence Proposition” (OECD 1990: 153). It is not very as-
tonishing, therefore, that huge differences among European welfare states in their
distribution between employers’ and employees’ shares of social security contri-
butions do not account for differences in the (static) macroeconomic performance
of these countries (Schmid 1999: 10).4 Nevertheless, the empirical evidence for
employment-increasing shifts from employers’ payroll taxes to income taxes is
rather inconclusive (OECD 1995: 68) and will not be developed further in the em-
pirical sections of this paper.
The general mechanism of tax incidence holds only for the assumption of com-
petitive labor markets. If wages are downwardly sticky, higher taxes will lead to
higher nominal wages and to higher product prices. This will, ultimately, result
in lower real wages. Temporal lags in the reaction functions can allow for a tem-
porary decrease in the overall demand for labor. The OECD (1990: 173; see also
Nickell/Layard 1999: 3058) argues that, even though the Invariance Proposition
holds true from a long-term perspective, there are significant short-term aberra-
tions from equilibrium values.
The existence of unemployment in a labor market is closely related to this prob-
lem. Structural unemployment, such as qualitative mismatch, slows the respon-
siveness of employment to tax cuts or increases. Further, in neoclassic approaches
to labor markets, unemployment benefits, which are the only form of “reserva-
tion wages” in these models, are directly linked to taxation. Thus a change in
taxation does not alter the level of unemployment by the mechanism of wage
bargaining (Nickel/Layard 1999: 3050). The problem with these models is, how-
ever, that many social security systems contain elements of redistribution. Not all
social transfers are linked to taxation. In such cases, an increase of total taxation
can lead to both lower rates of employment and higher unemployment.5 Alterna-
tive economic explanations for unemployment, such as the “efficiency-wage”
model, argue that payroll taxes do have a negative indirect impact on employ-
ment as they drive the equilibrium wage rate further away from the point of
market clearing (Phelps 1994: 155; Pissaridis 1998; Goerke 2002).
Finally, a dynamic perspective suggests that a high tax burden leads to lower
economic growth and to higher capital-to-labor ratios in the long run. This, in
turn, reduces employment (Nickell/Layard 1999: 3052). Similarly, Daveri and
                                                  
4 There are, however, empirical studies showing that employers’ social security contri-
butions do exert a negative impact on employment (OECD 1995: 83).
5 Take a basic insider-outsider model as an example: as long as both the wage and out-
side options are indexed on net-of-tax wages, taxation does not lead to additional
wage pushes. If there is redistribution, however, then taxation does hurt the inside
option (wage) much more than the outside option (transfers).
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Tabellini (2000) argue that taxation has an impact on unemployment beyond the
short-term perspective. The authors assume differing wage-bargaining institu-
tions to be of primordial importance. For this reason, the negative impact of taxa-
tion on employment is strongest in continental Europe, where taxation enhances
the push to increase real wage. They conclude that high labor costs induced by
labor taxes are an important source of unemployment in these countries (Daveri/
Tabellini 2000; Daveri 2001).
Table 1 Selective Overview of Studies on Taxation and Employment /Unemployment
Impact of Taxation Policy Implications
TOTTAX Tax Mix Overall Cut Revenue-
neutral Shift
Blundell /
MaCurdy 1999 substantive – yes –
OECD 1995 substantive marginal yes ambiguous
Scharpf 2000 – substantive – cut PAYTAX &INDTAX
Employment
Bauer /
Riphahn 1998 – marginal – irrelevant
Nickell /
Layard 1999 marginal
short-run
effect
marginal
effect only cut PAYTAX
Daveri /
Tabellini 2000 substantive substantive yes cut PAYTAX
Pissaridis 1998
Goerke 2002 substantive substantive yes ambiguous
Unemployment
OECD 1995 ? marginal ambiguous irrelevant
Table 1 gives a selective overview of economic studies dealing with the topic. In
general, microeconomic analyses (e.g. Blundell/MaCurdy 1999) usually focus on
the relation between taxes and employment. They find causal pathways explain-
ing potentially negative effects. But they usually consider the total tax burden to
be of much more importance than different forms of taxation. The policy conclu-
sion of such studies frequently amounts to overall cuts in taxation or in smooth-
ing kinks in net taxation. Similarly, macroeconomic analyses – dealing with the
link between unemployment and taxes – emphasize the role of total tax burdens.
While there is evidence somewhat favorable to the assertion that the total tax
burden matters for unemployment, at least in the short run, the literature on tax-
mixes is much more cautious. If they matter at all, labor taxes are commonly as-
sumed to be most problematic (Daveri 2001), while consumption taxes are gener-
ally considered to be less harmful, with income taxes ranging somewhere in be-
tween (OECD 1995: 69).
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Most of these accounts deliver valuable insights into the mechanisms of taxes and
the labor market. They are less capable, however, of explaining the success or
failure of different strategies to fund welfare states. Since taxation and social
transfer systems may be treated as “twin institutions” of a larger welfare state re-
gime, taxes should be of crucial importance in shaping the accompanying labor
markets. The integration of tax regimes into the comparative analysis of welfare
states adds to an understanding of these processes. It is for this reason that the
paper now focuses on some macroinstitutional aspects of taxation.
2.2 A Macroinstitutional Approach of “Tax Regimes”
The aim of this section is to fuse the economic discussion of tax-mixes with an
analysis inspired by comparative research on welfare states. It proceeds in three
steps, the first of which is to discuss the links between both sides of the public
budget, meaning revenues and expenditures. The underlying idea of this step is
that the welfare state regime consists of both a tax and a social transfer (sub-)
regime. Hence, even if we do not account for social expenditures directly when
analyzing the tax–employment link, social expenditures loom large in the causal
mechanisms between taxation and the labor market. While on a quantitative
level, the best initial option would be to “net out” taxes and social transfers –
thereby gaining reliable information about individual incentives – this is prob-
lematic for other reasons. On the one hand, this would assume away an interest-
ing feature of welfare states: high rates of “tax churning” in the provision of pub-
lic goods (OECD 2001: 163). Welfare states do redistribute significant amounts of
money between an individual’s own “pockets,” for reasons that are not always
easy to grasp.6 On the other hand, the construction of net government budgets is
a fairly cumbersome empirical procedure (Adema 1999). This paper therefore
follows a different strategy. It deals with taxation only, but first tries to relate tax
systems to the social transfer system.
The second step is to scrutinize the tax structures in OECD countries across time.
This will reveal some of the significant differences between countries that share
similarly high tax burdens. It also prompts us to ask how differences in tax
structures are related to the three welfare state regimes or clusters.
The last step is to embed the tax regime back into labor markets and to derive the
impact of different tax regimes on labor market outcomes. Some strategies of
funding the welfare state are harmful to employment and may also increase un-
                                                  
6 “Intra-personal” redistribution is still a neglected, underdeveloped field of research.
Some notable but cautious exceptions are Korpi/Palme (1998), Estevez-Abe et al.
(1999), and Iversen/Soskice (2001).
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employment. The discussion also points at the distinction between exposed and
sheltered economic sectors and, more specifically, between manufacturing and
low-skilled service sectors. In conclusion, it deals with the temporal evolution of
the “tax–employment link.”
2.2.1 The Relation between Tax and Social Transfer Regimes
A stylized framework for the analysis of linkages between the tax and social
transfer systems is sketched in Figure 1. It shows a stylized balance sheet of pub-
lic revenues and outlays for a “prototypical” welfare state. On the revenue side –
which neglects other sources of public income – three important forms of taxation
are listed: income taxes (INCTAX), indirect taxes (INDTAX), and payroll taxes
(PAYTAX). To each form, three properties are attributed: the functional relation-
ship between income and amount of taxation (progressiveness), the comprehen-
siveness of the tax basis in terms of the number of people affected, and the exis-
tence of some form of discrimination between individuals, predominantly be-
tween married couples and single earners.
Figure 1 Relation between Tax and Social Transfer Systems
Prototypical Public Accounting System
Revenues (Taxes) Properties
Functional Form
Tax Base
Discrimination
Outlays
(Social
Expenditures)
Properties
Status-preservation
Conditions
Familialization
INCTAX
Progressive
Semicomprehensive
Family-oriented
Child Benefits
Individualistic
Children
Family-oriented
INDTAX
Flat-rate
Comprehensive
Individualistic
Social Assistance
Individualistic
Income, Wealth
Family-oriented
Linear Unemployment
Benefits
Status
Unemployment
Family-oriented
SemicomprehensivePAYTAX
Family-oriented
Pensions
Status
Previous Work
Family-oriented
Health
Individualistic
Sickness
Family-oriented
Others Others
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On the expenditure side, some of the major forms of (passive) social transfers are
enumerated. Once again, other categories of social transfers and, more impor-
tantly, other forms of government expenditures are omitted. The five major forms
of social transfers typically consume more than two-thirds of the social budget,
which is more than 60 percent of the entire public-spending total. According to
standard comparative welfare state analysis, three major properties associated
with these transfers may be encountered (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990 and 1999).
The first one is the differentiation between “status-preserving” and “status-
reversing” social transfers. Prominent examples for the transfers that ensure indi-
viduals equivalent amounts of money during both the working and non-working
periods of their lives are public pension systems and unemployment benefits. The
second property deals with the criteria of eligibility that are attached to certain
social transfers. Sometimes this is captured by the distinction between means-
tested vs. universalistic benefits. The conditions for eligibility are not the same
among the five classes of social transfers. Health benefits, for example, are usually
connected to illness, whereas unemployment benefits are linked to job-loss and
job-search activities. The third property relates to the question concerning how
families are treated under different social transfer mechanisms. Many public pen-
sion systems, for instance, discriminate between singles and married couples.
Of course, national policy strategies are highly diverse, even in the case of income
taxation (Ganghof 2000, 2001). In some countries, income taxation is traditionally
rather family-oriented and uses a joint-taxation system, whereas in others, mar-
ried couples are taxed separately. More significantly, some countries tax social
transfers, thereby increasing the tax basis. As a consequence, the differences be-
tween apparently benevolent welfare states such as Denmark or the Netherlands
and neoliberal welfare states are not really very pronounced once these countries
are compared on a net basis (Adema 1999). Moreover, in countries like the US or
UK, some social policies are achieved by various forms of negative income taxa-
tion, whereas other countries utilize more “traditional” means such as direct in-
come subsidies. In short, the system of taxation is as much part of the welfare re-
gime as it is part of the social security system. The distribution of properties and
proportions for both taxes and social transfers may differ from one country to an-
other. This is the reason why this balance sheet has a simplified and “prototypi-
cal” design.
Some parallels between taxes and social transfers are worth noting. First of all,
there is a major distinction dividing these into two categories. In the one category
are direct and indirect taxes as well as child benefits and social assistance. These
are not status-preserving since they redistribute money. In the other category is
payroll-tax financed spending on unemployment benefits and public pensions.
Both are indexed to previously earned income and hence guarantee equivalence
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between taxes and entitlements. Somewhere in between there is public health in-
surance, which is usually linearly associated with income but frequently offers
equal in-kind benefits for all.
A second parallel exists between the principle of joint taxation and family-oriented
social benefits. Both policies sustain the male breadwinner type of welfare provi-
sion. Family-oriented welfare states differ sharply from systems that treat indi-
viduals (approximately) equally.
Finally, means-testing and other forms of conditioning seem compatible with
both very high and low levels of top-down redistribution. They are usually not
compatible with status-preserving transfers. The prime example here is public
pensions, where governments all across the OECD world are desperate to con-
strain early retirement and constantly have to redefine the conditions for receiv-
ing transfers. Unemployment benefits seem to be a deviant case, as they are at the
same time status-preserving and yet dependent on the condition of job-searching.
Again, internal tensions between both principles are legendary and lead to noto-
rious debates about how to activate people in their search behavior.
Such a framework for tax–transfer mechanisms incorporates issues otherwise ne-
glected in the analysis of welfare states. It explicitly takes into account the direct
and indirect taxation of wages and “reservation wages.” Besides, it includes social
policy programs that are entirely financed through the revenue side of the gov-
ernment budget. Tax breaks and allowances for social purposes are the most im-
portant in this area. An entirely different issue, however, is social policy that is
merely publicly mandated (Adema 1999). To a large extent, these forms of social
policies follow the logic of non-monetary regulations of labor markets and cannot
be easily subsumed into the tax and social transfer system (Nickell/Layard 1999;
Saint-Paul 1996).
2.2.2 The Evolution and Differences of National Tax Regimes
As mentioned in the introduction, tax-to-GDP ratios have risen considerably in
the last 40 years. Today, the average ratio for OECD countries is close to 40 per-
cent of GDP. At the same time, the tax structure has not remained stable either,
since some forms of taxation have increased faster than others (Figure 2).
Whereas payroll, corporate income, and property taxes have not changed in rela-
tive terms, social security contributions increased at a rate of nearly 40 percent
between 1965 and 1997. Personal income taxation has clearly dropped from the
highpoint reached in the 1980s, which shows the impact of a series of income tax
reforms in most of the OECD countries (Blundell/MaCurdy 1999). Correspond-
ingly, a clear shift in the tax bases from mobile capital to immobile labor is obvious
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Figure 2   Evolution of the Tax-Mix in OECD Countries between 1965 and 1997
(Daveri 2001; Ganghof 2000). A second major shift occurred between specific and
general consumption taxes. This implies that, although the total amount of con-
sumption taxes has barely changed, the nature of such taxation definitely has.
Specific consumption taxes typically include taxes on international trade and sin-
gle commodities such as oil. The shift to general consumption leads to a larger tax
base and to a “diffuse” redistribution instead of an explicit redistribution, as in
the case of taxing specific goods.
The average across countries conceals large and persisting differences between
them. To this end, three forms of taxation are further analyzed here: INCTAX
consists of both personal and corporate taxes, PAYTAX includes all social secu-
rity contributions, and INDTAX refers to specific and general consumption taxes.
Table 2 shows these three broad categories as a percentage of total taxation
(TOTTAX) in 1995, as well as two different measures for the overall amount of
public provision of social transfers. Traditional gross public social expenditure as
a percentage of GDP (GSER) is closely related to total taxation (rPearson = 0.94).
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The second measure – net social expenditure (NSER) – broadens the definition of
the public provision of social transfers. It includes several kinds of privately or-
ganized social security contributions that are either publicly mandated or subsi-
dized to a significant extent (Adema 1999: 28). The low and insignificant coeffi-
cient of correlation (rPearson = 0.44) between TOTTAX and NSER alludes to the fact
that Adema’s definition is clearly deviating from the traditional understanding of
social policy. It shows that the use of both taxes and social expenditures as indi-
Table 2 Indicators of Taxation and Social Expenditures for 1995
Social Expenditures Tax Revenues Tax Wedgec
Country GSERa NSERa TOTTAXa INCTAXb PAYTAXb INDTAXb
AUT 26.2 – 42.3 26.7 42.8 27.7 27.2
AUL 17.8 18.4 30.4 55.3 6.9 29.3 16.1
BEL 28.8 23.9 46.0 38.5 33.0 26.1 40.3
CAN 18.6 18.3 36.0 46.7 16.4 25.3 21.7
SWI 21.0 – 33.5 37.3 37.0 18.5 18.9
GER 27.1 24.7 39.2 30.1 39.5 27.8 37.3
DEN 30.5 20.9 51.4 60.3 3.5 32.5 30.9
FRA 30.1 – 44.6 17.5 45.7 27.4 39.5
FIN 31.9 23.0 46.1 40.1 27.6 29.7 42.1
ITA 23.7 20.0 41.3 35.1 32.0 27.4 44.9
IRE 19.4 16.6 33.8 39.1 15.7 40.8 26.8
JAP 13.8 – 28.5 36.5 36.5 15.1 15.1
NOR 27.6 19.7 41.5 35.2 23.6 38.6 24.4
NET 26.8 22.3 43.8 26.3 41.8 27.4 34.9
NEW 18.8 – 37.9 60.7 1.0 33.3 22.4
SWE 33.0 24.5 49.6 41.3 31.3 24.2 42.2
UK 22.4 22.6 35.6 36.5 17.7 35.4 26.1
USA 15.8 22.5 27.9 45.9 25.1 17.9 24.4
Mean 24.1 21.3 39.4 39.4 26.5 28.0 29.7
Std. Dev. 5.8 2.6 7.0 11.4 13.8 6.7 9.6
a In percent of GDP.
b In percent of total taxation (TOTTAX).
c In percent of gross labor costs.
Note: GSER = OECD Gross Social Expenditure Ratio; NSER = Net Social Expenditure Ratio (Adema 1999:
30–31), TOTTAX = Total Tax Revenues; INCTAX = Total Income Tax Revenues; PAYTAX = Total Social Se-
curity Contribution and Payroll Tax Revenues; INDTAX = Total Indirect Tax Revenues (OECD 1999); Tax
Wedge = Total personal income taxes and social security contributions for average production worker (OECD
1998).
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cators for the size of welfare states always presupposes the selection of a specific
notion of social policy.
Table 2 also shows that it is not straightforward to allocate advanced welfare
states to the three traditional clusters of welfare state regimes as advocated by
Esping-Andersen (1990). Although all four Scandinavian welfare states have high
overall tax burdens, some of the continental European economies – e.g. Belgium
and France – also exhibit high levels of taxation. If these “average” tax rates are
compared with effective tax wedge data (last column of Table 2), Italy becomes
the welfare state with the highest overall tax burden. Similar problems arise for
the tax-mix. It is true that continental European countries rely heavily on payroll
and consumption taxes, as opposed to income taxes dominant in Scandinavia. But
the pattern is far from being perfect. A third of British tax revenues and some 40
percent of Norwegian ones consist of payroll taxes. A concise, empirical cluster-
ing on the basis of tax burdens and tax-mixes is a tricky endeavor.7
Bearing this caveat in mind, different welfare state strategies are useful images to
characterize tax structures. Nordic welfare states are based on a universalistic tax
regime, with a high overall tax burden as well as high rates for both the top and
marginal of income taxation. “Bismarckian-type” continental European welfare
states stress the role of social security contributions, as social security systems are
heavily based on the public insurance system. In addition, the tax–transfer
mechanism explicitly favors family incomes against single earners – it is “famili-
alizing” (Esping-Andersen 1999). Anglo-Saxon welfare states, finally, provide the
least public resources for social expenditures of all three clusters. There, the tax
system is similar to Nordic taxation, but some countries make heavy use of tax
breaks and other social policies that are based on the revenue side.
2.2.3 Employment Effects of Tax Regimes
How are the aforementioned cross-country and temporal differences in the tax-
mix related to employment? As the economic literature and the suggested
macroinstitutional balance sheet imply, different forms of taxation affect employ-
ment differently. For sectors with low productivity, consumption taxes and social
security contributions are particularly painful as they form a major part of overall
labor costs. Such sectors may either be crowded out by market forces or by high
reservation wages that make it unattractive to take up work. The opposite of this
is income taxation (Scharpf 2000: 80–82). Since income taxation usually begins
                                                  
7 Cluster analysis for 1995 values did not show any consistent ways of aggregating
countries into three groups. Results are available from the author on request.
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rather moderately at a certain minimum threshold, it harms sectors with a low
degree of productivity less than do social security contributions that do not ex-
empt a minimum cash flow. Similarly, consumption taxes can hurt these sectors
rather dramatically as they lower profit margins for the self-employed or small
enterprises. This contrasts with standard (macro)economic policy recommenda-
tions that usually prefer consumption to labor taxation. Moreover, qualitative dif-
ferences between tax regimes do exert a huge influence on employment levels.
The “familialization” of tax systems, for instance, leads to “nested” decision-
making between couples.
In addition, the “tax–employment” link has not remained stable. The conven-
tional argument about internationalization, taxation, and employment implies
that high taxation is a competitive disadvantage compared to other economies.
Increasing taxation thus forces non-wage labor costs up and ultimately drives
firms out of the market, given that there is international competition in goods
markets. This effect need not arise if highly productive firms can roll over the
costs on their workforces by lowering the net wage (Scharpf 2000a: 207). One of
the difficulties in assessing this argument is that levels of labor productivity
might be themselves endogenous to taxation. If this is the case, high levels of
taxation make internationally exposed firms reduce their workforce more than
firms in sheltered sectors. If the competitive sectors therefore appear ex post to be
insensitive to taxation, this might only reflect a higher apriori sensitivity.
An interesting question about economic integration or globalization is whether it
has changed “the rules of the game” for modern welfare states. Scharpf (2000b:
21) argues that the crisis of the 1970s was mainly fought and resolved on the
grounds of wage policy between central banks, employers, and trade unions. He
contrasts this with the situation of the 1990s, in which the problems that welfare
states face are different because the degree of market integration for capital and
goods is irreversibly higher than it was 20 years ago. Therefore, variation in the
welfare state regime should matter nowadays much more than in the period of
the oil crises.
If the idea is valid that institutions now matter, then the introduction of tax and
welfare regimes is a possible guiding principle for further analysis. According to
Scharpf (2000a: 215), Scandinavian welfare states have a comparatively “employ-
ment-friendly” tax structure that partially reduces the negative impact of a high
tax burden. With Anglo-American welfare states sharing very low levels of total
taxation, the worst performers in terms of employment creation are continental
European welfare states with high levels of “employment-harming” taxation.
To evaluate the employment-friendliness of different categories of taxation,
Scharpf decomposes total employment into different sectors. Total private or
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business employment can be split into a sheltered sector and an internationally
exposed one (2000a: 197). The sheltered sector mainly contains consumer-oriented
services like wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, or social services. The ex-
posed sector consists of manufacturing, utilities, and production-oriented services
such as financial services. These distinctions are helpful in that they differentiate
between varying levels of international competition and predominant skill re-
quirements. If only sectors with a higher average level of qualification among
their workforce are indeed capable of transferring higher taxes to consumers,
then taxes are particularly harmful for non-tradable sectors with a high concen-
tration of low skills and low productivity (ibid.: 210).8 In the same vein, not all
three main categories of taxation have the same negative impact on employment
in these low-skill sectors. If the globalization hypothesis holds, the general impact
of taxation on employment should have increased. A closed economy was able to
protect sectors via trade barriers and could therefore maintain high tax differen-
tials in relation to other economies.
2.3 Summary and Main Hypotheses
The general claim of an analysis inspired by microeconomic theory is that the to-
tal tax burden should exert a negative influence on employment. Although it is
not the key question for this paper, it nevertheless merits some elaboration be-
cause it is intertwined both theoretically and empirically with the issue of an op-
timal tax-mix.
The tax-mix, so the main research question of this paper, should matter. Con-
sumption taxes and social security contributions should be rather harmful for
private sector employment in advanced welfare states. Because (personal) income
taxes have “smaller” tax bases – in terms of people being affected – their impact
on employment should be substantially less vigorous.
The tax-mix should be of special importance for sectors with a low-skill and low-
pay profile. Both consumption taxes and payroll taxes directly punish workers
with low wages: these taxes are neither progressive nor do they exempt these
workers. Similarly, the tax-mix should be decisive for sheltered sectors in the
economy more than for exposed ones. International competition has already
“crowded” out vulnerable segments of the labor market. The employment per-
formance of economies thus hinges upon the ability of sheltered sectors to adjust
when they are suffering from excessively high levels of taxation.
                                                  
8 But see Freeman and Schettkat (2000) for an opposing view.
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Finally, the relationship between taxation and employment should have become
noticeably stronger in the last few decades. Due to globalization, national welfare
systems are nowadays less capable of neutralizing exogenous shocks. Exit-options
of mobile factors hamper private sector employment both on the demand and
supply side of labor markets through the tax system.
3 Time-Series and Cross-Sectional Analyses of OECD Countries
3.1 Data Sources and Descriptions
Data on taxation stem from “OECD Revenue Statistics.” Employment data are
taken from the OECD “Labor Force Statistics” and the “OECD Economic Out-
look.” Most of the other data comes from a set that was compiled at the Max
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.9 Data on trade with non-OECD coun-
tries come from the IMF “Direction of Trade Statistics.” For a subsection of the
country sample, wage data (compensation of employees) exist for levels of digit
one, ISIC. The source is the “OECD International Sector Data Base” and contains
no entries for AUT, IRE, NEW and SWI.
The term “taxation” follows the general OECD definition of “taxes” used in the
Revenue Statistics and includes social security contributions (OECD 1998: 30).
The variable “INCTAX“ contains all taxes with the OECD label “1000,“ i.e. taxes
on income, profits, and capital gains. “PAYTAX” combines two categories: “2000”
consists of compulsory social security contributions and “3000” consists of any
additional taxes on payroll and workforce. Finally, “INDTAX” corresponds to the
category “5000” of the OECD, i.e. taxes on goods and services like VAT, excises,
and sales taxes. The three tax variables are percentage values of GDP.
As the OECD (1999: 28ff.) states, tax-to-GDP ratios have to be analyzed with cau-
tion. First, there are several problems linked to economic cycles and the lags be-
tween accruals and receipts of taxes. Second, constant revisions of GDP lead to
structural breaks in the times series for some countries. As most countries have
not extended their GDP revisions into the past, the pooled time series exhibits
several structural breaks. To account for these problems, tests of robustness and
alternative tax measures, namely tax wedge data, have been used in addition to
revenue data.10 Finally, since the data are tax revenues relative to GDP, they are
                                                  
9 I thank Martin Schludi and the MPIfG for making the data available to me.
10 The general practice of using “effective tax rates” (Mendoza et al. 1994) is of limited
use for this paper as the temporal scope is too broad to compute these rates for all
countries. Tests for subsamples, however, have not revealed much of a difference to
the tax-to-GDP ratios.
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prone to problems of endogeneity. A decrease (increase) in employment leads to
a decrease (increase) in revenues and will automatically induce a positive sign for
regressions with employment or unemployment as the dependent.
The data for the dependent variables are defined as employment rates. The actual
dependent variable generated for each sector is “Total Employment” divided by
the working age population. If productivity levels for the sectors are allowed for
as a proxy for human capital, sectors 3 and 8 seem to belong to the highly quali-
fied part of the workforce, whereas sector 6 is markedly lower in its skill inputs,
leaving sectors 7 and 9 somewhere in the middle (Kemmerling 2000). However,
the average levels of productivity hide a considerable degree of within-sector
variation. Once again, the data are riddled by structural breaks, not all of which
seem to be tractable via the data descriptions in the Labor Force Statistics.11 In
addition, standard unemployment rates are used as dependent variables.
3.2 Time-Series Analysis for Germany, Sweden, and the United States
A first step in analyzing the tax–employment link is to look at the individual time
series for some countries. For the sake of simplicity, the analysis will focus on the
three “role models” in comparative welfare state analysis: Germany, Sweden, and
the United States (Esping-Andersen 1991). Recently, economists have used the
same sample countries in order to analyze institutional differences in the tax sys-
tem (Blundell/MaCurdy 1999).
A model for the relationship between taxes as a percentage of GDP and private
sector employment shows pronounced differences in the tax parameters (cf. Table
3).12 The set of exogenous variables consists of the three forms of taxation and two
variables to control for differences in the evolution of the labor markets: unem-
ployment and the wage.
The tax variables show a considerable variation across countries, although the
overall effect is rather limited. In the case of the United States, only indirect taxa-
tion exhibits a weakly negative impact on private employment. Taken together,
the tax variables do not seem to drive private employment in this model.13 In
                                                  
11 For most of the cases, the OECD variable “Number of Employees” contains entries.
Thus, the rates of annual changes of these data have been used to fill in missing val-
ues for each of the variables. In one case (SWI from 1980 to 1985), this procedure was
not possible. In order to retain this country in the sample, a simple trend estimation
accounting for missing values produced a continuous series.
12 The model is specified in an ARDL(1,1)-structure.
13 An F-Test comparing the model with tax variables and a model without them could
not reject the hypothesis that the tax coefficients are jointly zero.
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Table 3 Time-Series Analysis for Germany, Sweden, and the United States
Business Sector Employment (Level)
GER SWE US
Intercept 40.573***
(8.109)
38.682***
(5.925)
6.921
(12.385)
Lag BUSEMP 0.489***
(0.100)
0.397***
(0.092)
0.806***
(0.209)
Unemployment −0.853***
(−0.066)
−0.885***
(0.104)
−0.939***
(0.067)
Lag Unemployment 0.310*
(0.139)
−0.002
(0.175)
0.714***
(0.179)
Wage 0.135
(0.086)
−0.012
(0.014)
0.043
(0.189)
Lag Wage 0.073
(0.097)
0.021
(0.015)
−0.062
(0.193)
Income Taxes 0.107
(0.101)
0.037
(0.044)
0.113
(0.094)
Lag Income Taxes 0.056
(0.101)
0.154**
(0.056)
0.034
(0.105)
Payroll Taxes 0.064
(0.247)
−0.092
(0.054)
0.332
(0.408)
Lag Payroll Taxes −0.811***
(0.251)
−0.158***
(0.051)
0.507
(0.407)
Indirect Taxes −0.197
(0.178)
−0.481***
(0.087)
−0.146*
(0.079)
Lag Indirect Taxes −0.279
(0.181)
0.083
(0.081)
0.011
(0.458)
Adj. R^2 1.000 0.998 0.998
Nobs. 27 27 27
F-Test restricted
vs. full (6, 15) 4.5*** 8.75*** 1.25
DW-h −1.16 −1.235 −2.558***
ADF-Test −2.771 −3.399*** −4.101***
(Intercept, Trend) (1, 1) ( – , – ) (1, – )
Notes: Levels of significance: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
F-Test restricted vs. full: F-test that compares models with and without tax regressors.
DW-h: Durbin-Watson h-statistic for autocorrelation in AR-models (Gujarati 1995: 605).
ADF-Test: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for nonstationarity. Brackets contain information whether a trend
variable and/or an intercept was included in the test.
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general, the US tax-mix rests primarily on income taxation. Since public institu-
tions of social security play a much smaller role in the United States than in Ger-
many or Sweden, payroll taxes are quantitatively less relevant in the US tax-mix.
Sweden is, in many respects, a case opposite to that of the US. Taxation adds to
the explanatory power of the model. More interestingly, coefficients for payroll
and indirect taxation are negative, whereas income taxation enters with a positive
coefficient. This difference corroborates the idea that the tax-mix may matter.
Whether or why income taxation bears a positive sign is difficult to tell. Since it is
the lag of income taxes that matters, it may be more than pure endogeneity cre-
ated by economic growth. One argument in the literature deals with the capacity
of states to provide necessary infrastructure and factor endowments that have a
positive impact on employment via additional growth (Garrett 1998). This discus-
sion, however, goes beyond an analysis of the revenue side of the public budget.
For the purpose of the argument followed here, it is safe to say that income taxa-
tion seems to be less harmful than other taxes. In terms of policy reform, it is also
interesting to note that Sweden shifted taxes from indirect to income taxes
(Steinmo forthcoming) in the mid-1990s, while its labor market performance im-
proved considerably at the same time.
Like in Sweden, German taxation shapes labor market outcomes according to Ta-
ble 3, though the effect is predominantly derived from payroll taxation. If taxa-
tion of the previous period increases by one percent, private sector employment
drops by nearly the same amount. Given these results, attempts of German pol-
icy-makers to contain social security contributions may be seen as a form of labor
market policy. In general, Germany is a prime example for countries that have
tried to shift the tax-mix from income and payroll to both general and specific
forms of indirect taxation (Ganghof 2000).
The control variables in Table 3 show that labor market reactions differ between
the three countries. Wages seem to be insignificant, a possible hint that the model
is not correctly specified. Unemployment is the most important explanatory vari-
able in all three cases, but differs in its temporal structure. Since potential en-
dogeneity between unemployment and employment cannot be excluded, the re-
sults of all three cases are of limited explanatory power. In addition, nonstation-
arity is a serious problem in one of the cases. Unit-root tests show nonstationarity
for German data, whereas first differences are stationary in all three cases.
Moreover, the US series shows a significant amount of autocorrelation, so much
so that the results for Sweden turn out to be the most reliable compared to the
other two cases.
A further source of empirical distortions is also theoretically highly relevant: the
possibility for high correlation between the overall tax burden and indirect
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taxes.14 Supplementary time-series analysis (not shown) suggests that the overall
tax burden is positively associated with employment only in the Swedish case –
because it is somewhat weaker than for the three different forms of taxation.
Hence, there is some danger of confusing the impact of tax-mixes with the impact
of overall excessive tax burdens, but the danger should not be overrated. A final
note also needs to be made regarding the goodness accuracy of the model. Resid-
ual analysis shows that the model used so far performs worse during economic
downturns.15
Those caveats notwithstanding, the results have important consequences for the
subsequent discussion. First, country-specific effects are crucial in understanding
the link between taxation and employment. Taxation alone cannot resolve this
problem, even though tax forms differ in their impact on the various labor mar-
kets. Second, an important source of country-specific effects is plainly clear: labor
market regimes differ between these three countries. As expected by Daveri and
Tabellini (2000), tax effects are presumably smaller in the “atomistic” and flexible
US labor market and higher in continental and northern European countries.
3.3 Cross-Sectional Results for All Countries
Given the results of previous time-series analyses, cross section models have to be
treated with caution. Nevertheless, the following results may, tentatively, probe
into the two problems of tax-mixes and their temporal evolution. This is achieved
by a consecutive analysis of cross-country comparisons.
In the following, simple cross-sectional estimates for six years are shown (cf. Ta-
ble 4). Differences in unemployment are significant in the explanation of private
sector employment and imply that the traditional wage–employment nexus
might be distorted in cross-sectional analyses. Correspondingly, wages show
negative parameters for the subgroup of continental European welfare states.
Evaluating the regressions, most of the explanatory power comes from unem-
ployment, and the presence of heteroscedasticity could not be rejected (White-
tests in Table 4).
                                                  
14 Correlation – all countries from 1970 to 1997 – is high for TOTTAX with INDTAX
(0.73***) and intermediate for TOTTAX with PAYTAX (0.50***) and INCTAX (0.48***).
15 Plots of residuals show a “sluggish” behavior of predicted values for all three coun-
tries and different lag structures for GDP growth. The first oil crisis as well as the be-
ginning of the 1990s are biased upwardly and are then neutralized by downward bi-
ases in the following years.
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Income taxation is of significant importance for employment levels in two cases
(years 1981 and 1986). As far as the other two sources of taxation are concerned, a
temporal pattern seems to be suggestive: throughout the periods investigated,
payroll taxes exert a negative influence on private employment; in the 1990s, in-
direct taxes also show a negative impact on employment for the first time. This
implies that payroll taxes are a constant source of concern for the labor market,
whereas income and indirect taxes have changed sides.
The model is limited in its robustness. Finland and Japan are important outliers
because the model underestimates their employment performance. Australia and
New Zealand are significantly below the average of the model. Additional vari-
ables do little to improve the situation. Wage inequality as measured by the
OECD (1993, 1996), for instance, is not of great help to account for these outliers.16
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that antipodean welfare states perform
worse than the average, although both rely on income taxation as the most im-
                                                  
16 Cross-sectional models that include wage inequality as an additional independent
variable do not show any significant relationship between wage compression and
employment.
Table 4 Cross-Sectional Analysis for 17 OECD Countries
Business Sector Employment (Levels)
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
Intercept 63.11***
(10.12)
35.38**
(15.31)
56.75***
(10.99)
51.25***
(9.45)
56.04***
(8.49)
50.27***
(10.73)
Unemployment −3.10***
(0.55)
−2.03***
(0.54)
−1.62**
(0.32)
−1.31***
(0.27)
−1.42***
(0.27)
−0.82**
(0.28)
Wage 0.29
(0.24)
0.69*
(0.34)
0.36
(0.21)
0.49***
(0.15)
0.46***
(0.14)
−0.54**
(0.19)
Income Taxes −0.51
(0.32)
−0.53
(0.32)
−0.53*
(0.25)
−0.47**
(0.21)
−0.21
(0.20)
−0.26
(0.21)
Payroll Taxes −0.99***
(0.27)
−0.66*
(0.31)
−0.64**
(0.21)
−0.73***
(0.14)
−0.72***
(0.17)
−0.61***
(0.18)
Indirect Taxes −0.09
(0.26)
0.16
(0.34)
−0.04
(0.30)
−0.09
(0.21)
−0.57
(0.28)
−0.67**
(0.32)
Adj. R^2 0.75 0.23 0.77 0.91 0.93 0.89
F-Test 10.04** 3.88** 7.38*** 22.48*** 30.19*** 18.73***
White Chi^2(12) 15.37*** 12.39*** 16.95*** 13.02*** 13.27*** 17.42***
Notes: Levels of significance: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. White Chi^2: White’s test of heteroscedasticity.
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portant source for funding their welfare states. Clearly, this deviation cannot be
explained by the tax-mixes. New Zealand and Australia both share high levels of
targeting (Korpi/Palme 1998) as well as a comparatively low degree of progres-
siveness in income taxation. In New Zealand, in particular, personal income tax
does not exempt low-wage workers (Ganghof 2001: 9). This would imply that the
incentives of income taxes in these countries are more akin to those of payroll
taxes in other countries.
Several tests on a cross-sectional basis have been performed to control for the
overall tax burden. Pairs of regressors of both TOTTAX and individual tax forms
have been tested simultaneously. This could explain the deviant position of Japan
– which is indeed the country with the lowest overall tax burden in the sample –
but not that of other outliers. More importantly, regressions with relative tax
shares, i.e. individual tax forms as a percentage of total taxation, reveal equal or
even stronger results for payroll and indirect taxes.17 It seems plausible, therefore,
to assume that relative tax-mixes matter – even once they are controlled for the
overall tax burden.
4 Pooled Cross-Sectional Estimations
4.1 Tax Structure, Aggregate Employment and Unemployment
This part of the paper analyses the impact of the three forms of taxation on ag-
gregate business sector employment and unemployment. Two transformations of
the data have been performed. Due to problems of business cycles, annual obser-
vations have been replaced by five-year averages.18 First differences of the new
observations have been computed in order to account for the problem of nonsta-
tionarity. The set of control variables includes GDP growth and gross wages, i.e.
total compensation of employees relative to GDP. The two variables catch effects
of variations in output and the wage sum. This should eliminate the problem of
endogeneity in tax revenues. Since unemployment poses both theoretical and
empirical problems, it has been dropped as an independent variable.19 Instead,
                                                  
17 Across time, all three major forms of taxation appear significant, but the relationship
with private employment is much stronger for PAYTAX and INDTAX.
18 Daveri and Tabellini (2000) recommend this method for the use of unemployment
rates. Note that the problem of endogeneity is particularly relevant for regressions
between taxes and unemployment.
19 The reason for this is that they act as highly endogenous variables and result in a
“hidden” lagged dependent structure with typically disturbing consequences (Achen
2000; Kittel/Winner 2001).
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unemployment features as a new dependent variable in separate regressions in
order to account for cross-national differences explicitly.
Table 5 shows econometric results for a) business sector employment relative to
the working-age population and b) the unemployment rate. Whereas in the case
for employment, both fixed time- and country-effects were necessary, the equa-
tion with unemployment as the dependent only includes fixed time-effects. Multi-
collinearity does exist in both equations, but only to a limited degree. First-differ-
Table 5 Tax Structure, Employment and Unemployment
Business Sector Employment
(First Difference)
Unemployment
(First Difference)
FixTwo FixOne
First Difference (OLS/PCSE) (OLS/PCSE)
Intercept −2.986***
(0.917)
2.673***
(0.576)
GDP Growth 0.700***
(0.165)
−0.231
(0.178)
Wage 0.025***
(0.007)
−0.044
(0.054)
Income Taxes −0.069
(0.152)
0.076
(0.127)
Payroll Taxes −0.511*
(0.313)
0.470**
(0.266)
Indirect Taxes −0.574***
(0.202)
0.534***
(0.221)
MSE 3.266 2.537
Adj. R^2 0.48 0.31
Nobs. 85 85
Fixed Effects Time, Country Time
F-Test (no FE) 2.87*** 4.35***
    DF (Num/Den) (20/59) (4/75)
Condition Index 8.79 12.699
LM(CC), Chi^2(136) 282.72*** 233.35***
AR(1), N(0,1) 1.32 0.37
Notes: Significance:  * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.
Observations are first differences of 5-year averages; 17 countries, 5 periods.
Coefficients of Fixed Effects (FE) not shown.
OLS/PCSE = ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck /Katz 1996).
Condition Index for Multicollinearity
LM(CC), Chi^2(136): Breusch-Pagan LM Test for cross-sectional correlation (Green 2000: 601).
AR(1), N(0,1): Asymptotic Test for serial correlation in residuals, corrected for panel data (Gujarati 1995: 425),
test-statistic with normal distribution.
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encing did indeed eliminate autocorrelation. Cross-sectional correlation, finally,
could not be rejected according to the test statistics.
The signs of the tax coefficients follow the expected pattern. Payroll and indirect
taxes reduce private sector employment and increase unemployment. A change
of one percent in indirect taxation, in particular, decreases employment by half a
percent and raises unemployment by another half a percent. No significant nega-
tive impact of income taxation can be derived from these results.
According to Table 5, growth and wages are only relevant for private sector em-
ployment. Unemployment, in turn, is not affected by either of the two. This is in
line with the research of labor economists who have shown the sluggish behavior
of unemployment in relation to growth (e.g. Bean 1994). An exception to this rule
may be the case of Ireland, an important outlier in both regressions due to the
strong recovery of the Irish labor market in later periods. Nevertheless, Ireland
does not contradict the argument proposed here. Although Ireland has a high
proportion of indirect taxation, the tax-mix has been shifting towards income
taxes in recent decades. In general, sensitivity analyses show that the three tax
forms maintain the differences of their patterns but not the size of their impact.20
It is important to stress that the two equations presented here measure first-round
effects only (cf. section 2.1). Little is said about indirect effects via lower GDP
growth, changes in the capital-labor ratio, or the general effects of the demand
side.21
All things considered, the idea that payroll and indirect taxes matter more than
income taxes is justified on the grounds of these models. Income taxes exert an
only moderate influence on both employment and unemployment. Payroll and
indirect taxes do matter for the performance of labor markets much more drasti-
cally.
4.2 Tax Structure and Sectoral Employment
The second question of major interest is whether there are significant differences
between sectors of the economy that are exposed to international competition and
sectors that produce non-tradable goods and services. For this reason, two sectors
                                                  
20 For business employment, coefficients of payroll taxes range from −.33 (AUL) to
−1.02 (SWE) and coefficients of indirect taxes range from −.43 (JAP) to −.75 (SWE). In
brackets is the name of the excluded country.
21 Auxiliary regressions with growth as the dependent variable confirm the suspicion
that tax-mixes are also important in the long run. Only payroll and indirect taxes
pose a significant threat to long-term growth.
30 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/8
on the ISIC-level of digit one are compared. On the one hand, manufacturing
(ISIC3) represents an exposed sector where the impact of taxation should be
markedly lower. On the other, trade, restaurants and hotels (ISIC6) exemplify a
sector almost exclusively producing services for markets with limited geographi-
cal scope. According to section 2.2.3, in this sector the impact of high taxes should
be much higher than in the former case.
Table 6 replicates the model for private sector employment of the previous table
for these two sectors. Compared to Table 5, the test statistics in the bottom half of
Table 6 exhibit a similar structure of error terms. In particular, cross-sectional cor-
relation is still present. However, the inclusion of fixed effects is less justified than
Table 6 Tax Structure and Employment in Manufacturing and Services
Employment in Manufacturing
(First Difference, ISIC3)
Employment in Trade and
Restaurants
(First Difference, ISIC6)
FixOne none
First Difference (OLS/PSCE) (OLS/PSCE)
Intercept −2.002***
(0.775)
−0.070
(0.255)
GDP Growth 0.559**
(0.261)
0.239***
(0.088)
Wage 0.311
(0.264)
0.468**
(0.246)
Income Taxes −0.061
(0.117)
−0.018
(0.053)
Payroll Taxes 0.260
(0.179)
−0.145***
(0.059)
Indirect Taxes 0.124
(0.325)
−0.127
(0.143)
MSE 4.21 1.95
Adj. R^2 0.64 0.45
Nobs. 56 56
FE Time none
F-Test (no FE)
F-Value
2.407* ..
Condition Index 10.34 6.82
LM(CC), Chi^2(91) 145.71*** 121.11***
AR(1), N(0,1) 1.49 0.82
Notes: Significance:  * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01
see table 5; 14 countries, 4 periods (5-year averages).
.. not applicable.
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in Table 5. Fixed time-effects are only weakly significant for ISIC3 and not signifi-
cant for ISIC6.
Employment in both sectors is driven by growth, whereas wages only matter for
ISIC6. This could imply that a strategy of competitiveness and high productivity
indeed resulted in a form of insulation of ISIC3 against labor costs. As has been
suggested above, this finding would also make it clear that employment in manu-
facturing is – ex post – not very sensitive to taxation.22 Not one of the three tax
forms seems to harm this sector. This proposition does not hold for ISIC6. Rather,
ISIC6 depends not only on wages in a typical supply-side manner, but also on
payroll taxation. The higher this form of welfare-state funding is, the less em-
ployment there is in ISIC6.
Several other empirical tests have been performed to evaluate these findings. The
use of total taxation or tax wedges corroborates the thesis that taxation only mat-
ters for ISIC6. However, results for ISIC6 do not hold for all non-tradable sectors.
If ISIC6 is replaced by ISIC9, for instance, the sign of the tax coefficients changes
but maintains its significance.23 ISIC9 consists of social and personal services such
as health or education services. Therefore it is plausible to assume that tax vari-
ables such as payroll taxes are directly related to these kinds of public expendi-
tures. ISIC6, on the contrary, should not be affected by those expenditures.
To conclude, the results of this section moderately sustain the idea that the prob-
lem of taxation differs across economic sectors. Non-tradable sectors that usually
coincide with sectors of lower overall demand for human capital and low-pay
seem to suffer somewhat more from labor taxes, namely from high social security
contributions. The causality, however, remains unclear, since such effects may be
due to either differentials in productivity or international competitiveness, or
both. One way of dealing with this problem is to model internationalization ex-
plicitly. According to the “globalization thesis,” internationalization also accounts
for temporal variation in the employment effects of taxation.
4.3 Total Taxation, Trade, and Temporal Variation
The third major question posed in this paper was whether the (overall) impact of
taxation has increased in recent decades. Section 3.2 hints that there might be
                                                  
22 Empirical evidence on ISIC3, however, nourishes the suspicion that taxation plays an
important role in explaining cross-country variation in capital-to-labor ratios (Sum-
mers cited in Kemmerling 2000: 82).
23 This even holds when the number of government employees is subtracted from ISIC9
in order to account for private employment only.
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some truth in this claim. In successive cross sections, the impact of payroll taxes
was weaker in the 1970s than in the 1980s, but the reliability of the empirical re-
sults was clearly limited. In the same vein, the impact of indirect taxes increased
from the 1980s to the 1990s. Here an additional problem arises: This effect may be
due to international forces or to the fact that most countries shifted from specific
to general consumption taxes.
In the following, two strategies attempt to elaborate these questions further. One
way to account for increasing world market competition is to control for the
“usual suspects” directly. By the use of an indicator of North-South trade, the tax
effect should be purified from temporal variation. A second way to account for
temporal variation is to interact tax variables with dummies for each period. Ta-
ble 7 shows the results for the relationship between total taxation and business
sector employment and unemployment, respectively.
The second and fourth columns replicate Table 5, but also include an indicator for
North-South trade in the equations. North-South trade is operationalized as the
amount of imports from less developed countries in relation to total imports from
all countries. Correspondingly, this indicator does not deal with the general trend
of internationalization, which has ambivalent effects on total employment in
OECD countries. Instead, it focuses on trade in presumably labor-intensive
goods, seen as a direct “threat” to employees in developed countries.
Table 7 shows that this kind of trade seems to be relevant for unemployment, but
not for employment. In fact, the results for employment do not differ strongly
from the results derived in Table 5. Payroll and indirect taxes, in particular,
maintain their negative impact on employment. For unemployment, the situation
is different in as much as North-South trade not only increases unemployment,
but also changes some of the coefficients of other variables (cf. Table 7, column 4).
The prime example is growth, which now reduces unemployment, whereas in
Table 5 no such effect existed. Coefficients of payroll and indirect taxation are
somewhat reduced in their explanatory power.
Hence, North-South trade seems to matter for unemployment, but does not really
improve an understanding of the “tax–employment” link. One way to deal with
this problem is to look for the sources of North-South trade as a dependent vari-
able. This is, of course, a theoretically and empirically demanding issue that is
frequently investigated by trade economists. However, a very simple regression
of North-South trade on different forms of taxation suggests that high taxation
may indeed be a stimulus for trade. Hence, taxation may also increase unem-
ployment indirectly since it increases imports from less developed countries
(Wood 1994).
Kemmerling: Employment Effects of Welfare State Taxation Regimes 33
Table 7 Temporal Variation, Trade, Employment and Unemployment
Business Sector Employment
(First Difference)
Unemployment
(First Difference)
FixTwo FixTwo FixOne No fixed
First Difference (OLS/PCSE) (OLS/PCSE) (OLS/PCSE) (OLS/PCSE)
Intercept −2.944***
(0.892)
−3.145***
(1.106)
2.944***
(0.501)
2.347***
(0.934)
GDP Growth 0.688***
(0.164)
0.780***
(0.198)
−0.254
(0.162)
−0.287**
(0.162)
Wage 0.025***
(0.008)
0.025***
(0.008)
−0.674
(0.505)
−0.403
(0.445)
North-South Trade −0.183
(0.332)
−0.302
(0.283)
0.115***
(0.040)
0.133***
(0.038)
Tax100 −0.070
(0.151)
– 0.076
(0.123)
–
Tax200 −0.504*
(0.305)
– 0.417**
(0.245)
–
Tax500 −0.537***
(0.237)
– 0.319**
(0.187)
–
TotTax 73–77 – 0.048
(0.255)
– 0.148
(0.217)
TotTax 78–82 – −0.403**
(0.242)
– 0.304*
(0.189)
TotTax 83–87 – −0.250
(0.255)
– 0.395*
(0.240)
TotTax 88–92 – −0.355***
(0.171)
– −0.050
(0.25)
TotTax 93–97 – −0.336***
(0.141)
– 0.356***
(0.105)
Adj. R^2 0.51 0.54 0.39 0.32
F-Test (R^2) 3.74*** 3.21*** 6.34*** 3.86***
FE Time Country Time Country Time –
Nobs. 85 85 85 85
F-Test for TT73–97 .. 4.57*** .. 2.23**
DF (Num/Den) (4/56) (4/76)
Condition Index 9.87 20.83 15.95 18.37
LM(CC), Chi^2(136) 290.27*** 272.34*** 238.66*** 232.41***
AR(1), N(0,1) 1.28 1.04 0.36 0.48
Notes: see Table 5;
Significance:  * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01
.. not applicable
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If internationalization does not change the “tax–employment” link, temporal
variation in the link may be modeled directly. Columns 3 and 5 in Table 7 show
the results for total taxation interacted with dummies for each period analyzed.
For both dependent variables, coefficients are different across time. This finding
is broadly in line with the results of the consecutive cross sections (cf. section 3.3).
However, the impact does not simply increase in a linear fashion. Taxation in the
period after the second oil crisis (1978–82) is at least as harmful for employment
as the last two periods (1988–92 and 1993–97). An F-test indicates that the coeffi-
cients for each interacted tax variable indeed differ significantly in both regres-
sions.24
The results for payroll and indirect taxes (not shown) are more convincing. Espe-
cially for the case of payroll taxes, the coefficients of latter periods are larger and
the levels of significance are higher than for previous periods. Similarly, the im-
pact of indirect taxation has increased. Under the condition that globalization is
operationalized correctly as North-South trade,25 this finding adds plausibility to
the idea that broadening the basis of indirect taxes has also increased its impact
on employment.
For the case of unemployment, the results point in the same direction. The inclu-
sion of a trade variable makes the coefficient of total taxation lose its significance.
Only one of the tax period variables (total taxation of 1983 to 1987) is significant.
If the interacted variable of total taxation is replaced by its equivalent for payroll
taxes, there is a strong difference between the first two periods and the latter
three. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the coefficient is insignificant, whereas from
the 1980s onwards it increases in size and significance.
In summary, it is obviously difficult to establish any direct impact of trade on the
tax–employment link. The impact of total taxation on both total employment and
unemployment has also not increased in a linear and easy-to-interpret way. There
is some evidence that the effect of payroll taxes has continuously increased in the
last couple of decades, which is broadly in line with the argument proposed in
this paper.
                                                  
24 This comes at a price, however, since multicollinearity becomes stronger in compari-
son with a model containing a non-interacted variable for total taxation. The other
test statistics are similar to previous tables in suggesting no autocorrelation, but
cross-country correlation.
25 A number of alternative measures, such as the degree of openness of the capital ac-
count, have been used instead, none of which produced significant results.
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5 Conclusion
The main idea of this paper has been to argue that tax systems are an important
ingredient of the welfare state regimes in OECD countries. They are linked to
other institutions of the welfare state, such as the social transfer system, but re-
veal additional sources of variation both across countries and across time. The
tax-mix in particular, as one of the major characteristics of the tax regime, exerts
an impact on labor market outcomes.
In the overview, the argument was made for an integrated approach of measur-
ing the impact that taxes and social benefits have on employment. From an eco-
nomic perspective, taxes affect the incentives to work according to the standard
microeconomic theories of labor supply. Through their impact on equilibrium
wages, they also affect employment indirectly by enhancing unemployment.
Standard economic analysis usually focuses on overall tax burdens or underlines
the pernicious role of taxing labor. In this literature, tax-mixes play a subordinate
role.
A macroinstitutional account of welfare states in advanced economies advocates
a different view. It emphasizes the issue of tax-mixes and their impact on em-
ployment rates in economic sectors. The most obvious difference lies in the tax-
mix of income, payroll, and indirect taxation. Each of these forms of taxation has
unique characteristics in terms of progressiveness, relation to income, and the
conditioning of entitlements. As a consequence, their impact on employment
should differ in strength. A focus on tax-mixes enables the evaluation of variation
over time, because tax-mixes have been changing in numerous ways during the
last three decades. Accordingly, the impact of income, payroll, and indirect taxa-
tion should matter across countries and should become stronger across time.
The empirical results showed several key findings. First, tax-mixes do matter. The
overall impact of income taxation is considerably lower than those of social secu-
rity contributions and indirect taxes. This is true for both employment and un-
employment ratios. Even when controlled for the impact of overall tax burdens,
the magnitude of the three forms of taxation remains markedly different.
Second, taxation has a stronger effect for sheltered sectors with low productivity.
Low-wage services are particularly vulnerable in that respect, whereas interna-
tionally exposed sectors such as manufacturing are insensitive to taxation.
Third, the hypothesis that globalization has increased the harmful impact of
taxation on employment could not be substantiated. The evidence for a relation-
ship between trade and the tax–employment link is rather limited. Empirical
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analyses suggest that the impact of taxation increases over time, but the estima-
tions were not very robust.
Finally, a couple of additional problems may be relevant for future research. In
general, on the level of international comparison and with special hindsight to
economic sectors, the quality of data is still a major obstacle to better estimations.
For example, the degree of part-time work provides an invisible variation in the
dependent variable that has led all models to be biased for such countries as the
Netherlands. Other relevant features of the tax system, such as the familialization,
may also account for major differences in the performance of national labor mar-
kets.
The way causality was modeled in the previous sections was necessarily limited.
For example, high taxation also may induce trade. This puts labor markets indi-
rectly under pressure. This is even more relevant, since labor market structures
and institutions differ dramatically across countries. Future research could make
the claims about the “tax–employment link” contingent on different institutional
settings governing labor markets (Daveri/Tabellini 2000).
With these caveats in mind, an analysis of tax regimes still has the ability to point
out crucial differences in the ways taxes influence employment both across time
and countries. In terms of policy conclusions, what plays a significant role is not
only the overall tax burden, but also the mix of different forms of taxation. Shift-
ing taxes away from mobile sources, such as income, comes at a cost of lower lev-
els of employment participation. Indirect taxes, frequently seen as the “lender of
last resort” for finance ministers fighting tax erosion, are an important source of
sluggish job growth in many continental European countries.
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